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Prisoners are among the most vulnerable people in our society—and the most forgotten and mistreated among them 
are those living in solitary confinement.  Today, nearly 100,000 Americans, including youth and people with 
serious mental illness, spend 23 hours a day alone in cells smaller than parking spaces with almost no human 
engagement.  Some live like this for days, others for decades.  Over a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized 
that solitary confinement had been all-but-eliminated because it was “found to be too severe,” but the practice has 
made a resurgence in the last three decades.  And somehow—despite an overwhelming societal and medical 
consensus today that the harms of solitary confinement are, still, too severe—the practice remains uninhibited by 
the Constitution in almost all forms, applied to almost all individuals, in almost all jurisdictions in America.  
Now, however, the tide may be turning.  Federal district courts have in recent years shown an increased willingness 
to question solitary confinement’s permissibility under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment, starting with particularly harsh forms of confinement against particularly vulnerable groups of people.  
Moreover, this occurs in the midst of a trend of expansions of Eighth Amendment rights and a growing recognition 
by state legislatures, professional organizations, and international bodies that solitary confinement is unacceptably 
harmful by today’s “evolving standards of decency.”  And with the retirement of frequent solitary confinement 
critic Justice Kennedy, the center of gravity for judicial action is set to shift even further to the lower courts. 
At this potentially pivotal moment, this three-part Article series seeks to provide the first comprehensive overview 
of the practice of solitary confinement in America and of the Eighth Amendment litigation it has spurred.  And 
building on this context, the series introduces and details two arguments, under two separate Eighth Amendment 
doctrines, contending that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional. 
Too often, discussion in the legal academy and among practitioners and 
policymakers concentrates simply on the adjudication of guilt or innocence.  
Too easily ignored is the question of what comes next.  Prisoners are shut 
away—out of sight, out of mind.  It seems fair to suggest that, in decades 
past, the public may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a 
careful assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges 
assumed these matters were for the policymakers and correctional experts. 
– Davis v. Ayala (Kennedy, J., concurring)1 
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1 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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With a factual backdrop established in Article I of this series, we can now 
turn to the present constitutional status of solitary confinement.  This Article 
seeks to offer a deep dive into Eighth Amendment solitary confinement 
litigation—demonstrating that district courts have been increasingly 
receptive to Eighth Amendment challenges, leading to preliminary 
injunctions and settlement agreements banning the harshest solitary 
practices.  It will start with a brief overview of the two primary Eighth 
Amendment analyses that can be used to challenge the constitutionality of 
solitary (these will be the subjects of Article III’s arguments for a per se 
holding).  It will then discuss how, despite solitary confinement’s persistent 
status as constitutional according to the courts, there has been recent 
momentum in a number of district courts pushing against the practice’s 
constitutionality.  Finally, it will consider how difficult it is for plaintiffs to win 
in court and how settlements and non-complete per se holdings (i.e., per se 
holdings banning solitary confinement of individuals with serious mental 
illness, but allowing it for all other prisoners) have led to major enforcement 
issues pointing to the need for a complete per se holding. 
I.  THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”2  
The Supreme Court has announced and reiterated the Amendment’s 
aspirational value: “nothing less than the dignity of man.”3  The Court has 
made clear over the years that this clause prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment applies not just to the sentencing of convicted individuals but to 
the conditions that these individuals face while incarcerated.  Put simply, 
“[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment 
subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards”4 because, as the 
Court reminded us in 2011, “[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons.”5  Specifically, prison officials have the obligation to 
“provide humane conditions of confinement.”6 
Article III of this series will contend that two doctrines of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence can and should lead to the conclusion that 
solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional in all forms and against all 
individuals.  It will offer an argument under the “evolving standards of 
 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 
510 (2011) (“Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.”). 
 4 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). 
 5 Brown, 563 U.S. at 510. 
 6 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable 
prisons,’ but neither does it permit inhumane ones . . . .”) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 349 (1981)) (internal citations omitted). 
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decency” doctrine and under the “deliberate indifference” doctrine.  
Accordingly, this Part seeks to provide the legal backdrop for these 
arguments, and for the discussion of the current constitutional status of 
solitary confinement in the remainder of this Article. 
A.  The “Evolving Standards of Decency” Doctrine and the “Deliberate Indifference” 
Doctrine 
For over half a century, the Supreme Court has established that the 
Eighth Amendment derives its meaning from “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”7  In the 1958 case of 
Trop v. Dulles,8 the Court, determining that using denationalization as a form 
of punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, stated: 
This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth 
Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not 
surprising.  But when the Court was confronted with a punishment of 12 
years in irons at hard and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying 
public records, it did not hesitate to declare that the penalty was cruel in its 
excessiveness and unusual in its character.  The Court recognized in that 
case that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope 
is not static.  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.9 
With these words six decades ago, the Court established that the Eighth 
Amendment standard changes based on the values and progress of the day.  
Since then, the Court has created various doctrines to determine whether a 
practice violates this “evolving standards of decency” principle. 
One such doctrine that is relevant to solitary confinement—and the first 
that will be presented as an argument in Article III—is referred to, fittingly, 
as the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine.  The Court established 
under this doctrine that several factors should be considered in deciding 
whether a type of punishment violates society’s evolving standards of 
decency.10  These include the actions of state legislatures, the opinions of 
relevant professional organizations, international norms, the history of the 
type of practice’s use, and others.11 
A second relevant doctrine is the “deliberate indifference” doctrine.  The 
 
 7 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 8 356 U.S. 86. 
 9 Id. at 100–101 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 10 See, e.g., Samuel B. Lutz, The Eighth Amendment Reconsidered: A Framework for Analyzing the Excessiveness 
Prohibition, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1867–68 (2005) (“As its name implies, the evolving standards 
of decency doctrine requires courts to analyze prevailing community standards in order to 
determine whether a particular punishment conforms with established or developing social 
norms.”). 
 11 See infra Andrew Leon Hanna, Solitary Confinement as Per Se Unconstitutional (Article III), 21 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019). 
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Court devised this doctrine to determine whether the specific conditions a 
prisoner is subjected to during confinement violate the Eighth Amendment.12  
The two prongs of the deliberate indifference test—which, when satisfied, 
means a correctional institution has violated the Eighth Amendment—are: 
a) the institution must have maintained conditions that inflicted harm that is 
“sufficiently serious” or exposed inmates to a “substantial risk of serious 
harm” (an objective test); and b) the institution’s official(s) must have acted 
with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety” (a subjective test).13  
The requisite knowledge level to meet the second, more difficult prong for 
plaintiffs is recklessness—”somewhere between negligence and purpose or 
knowledge: namely, recklessness of the subjective type used in criminal 
law.”14  
B.  Applicability of Doctrines to Solitary Confinement 
Both of these doctrines can be applied to solitary confinement, providing 
two independent routes to a potential holding that the practice is per se 
unconstitutional.  As noted, the primary distinction between the doctrines is 
that the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine is applied to general types 
of punishment, while the “deliberative indifference doctrine” is applied to 
specific prison conditions.  Either is applicable to solitary; it can be 
challenged as an unconstitutional type of punishment or as an 
unconstitutional prison condition.  Though most courts today delve into the 
detailed “deliberate indifference” analysis, there has not been any indication 
that solitary as a type of punishment cannot be held unconstitutional against 
the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine.  The doctrine has been used 
significantly in determining the constitutionality of “modes of punishment” 
in the sentencing sphere—particularly death penalty and life-without-parole 
sentences—leaving untapped potential in applying it to “modes of 
punishment” in the conditions of confinement sphere, like solitary 
confinement.15  This has occasionally led commentators to briefly note the 
doctrine’s potential applicability and effectiveness in conditions of 
confinement cases, especially in the context of solitary confinement.16  It is 
 
 12 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (establishing the deliberate indifference doctrine to 
determine when poor provision of medical care in prison rises to an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 13 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 14 Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). 
 15 See Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 959–62 (2018) (noting 
that placement of prisoners in solitary confinement can be considered a mode of punishment subject 
to the evolving standards of decency doctrine, and briefly considering whether there is a consensus 
against the practice). 
 16 See, e.g., id. at 962 (“[O]ne could argue that solitary confinement is simply inconsistent with evolving 
standards of decency.  After all, if legislatures have abandoned use of solitary confinement as 
punishment for criminal violations because of the severity of the punishment, one could argue that 
prison officials are even less empowered to use solitary confinement as punishment.”); Civil Rights 
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past time for this argument to be made in full force, compelling courts to 
directly confront the fact that solitary confinement is starkly out of step with 
today’s standards of decency.  
Article III of this series will argue that an analysis under either doctrine 
can and should lead to a decision of per se unconstitutionality.  It will contend 
that applying the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine to solitary 
confinement indicates that the practice as a general matter is incompatible 
with society’s evolving standards of decency and is thus a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.  Article III will also provide an alternative argument 
under the more detailed “deliberate indifference” doctrine, particularly 
because courts commonly apply this test to solitary confinement challenges.  
It will contend that when the “deliberate indifference” doctrine is applied to 
any set of specific conditions involving the use of solitary confinement, it will 
meet the “deliberate indifference” test, meaning it violates the Eighth 
Amendment in all instances.  Both analyses therefore lead to the same 
conclusion:  solitary confinement always contravenes the Eighth 
Amendment.   
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL IN ALMOST ALL FORMS, AGAINST ALMOST ALL 
PRISONERS, IN ALMOST ALL PLACES 
The practice of solitary confinement remains unrestrained by the 
Constitution in just about all forms, imposed on just about all groups of 
prisoners, in just about all jurisdictions in America.  Relatively few courts 
have weighed in on the Eighth Amendment constitutionality of solitary 
confinement.  And although several cases decry the imposition of solitary 
confinement as a general matter, as well as in particular manners and when 
imposed on particularly vulnerable groups, no published opinion yet goes so 
far as to assert that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional.17  Overall, 
 
— Eighth Amendment — Third Circuit Holds Parents of Mentally Ill Young Man Held in Solitary Confinement 
Stated Claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment — Palakovic v. Wetzel, 131 HARV. L. REV 1481, 1487–
88 (2018) [hereinafter Civil Rights — Eighth Amendment] (applying the evolving standards of decency 
doctrine to argue that solitary confinement of individuals with serious mental illness is per se 
unconstitutional). 
 17 See Kenneth M. Cole III, The Constitutional Status of Solitary Confinement, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 476, 
476–77 (1972) (contending that the “mantle of precedent” created by “administrative control of 
inmates considered to be a threat” and state laws or regulations allowing solitary confinement as a 
permissible “method of enforcing prison rules and discipline” has prevented courts from frequently 
reconsidering the constitutionality of the practice).  Some cases have found long-term solitary 
confinement to be unconstitutional, as applied, when including certain additional harmful 
elements—see, for example, cases striking down solitary confinement that involved forced nudity.  
See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 
(E.D. Pa. 1969).  Others have found that the practice is per se unconstitutional when it involves 
particularly vulnerable groups—for example, the handful of cases striking down solitary 
confinement of individuals with serious mental illness, as will be discussed in greater detail.  See, e.g., 
Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other grounds and remanded sub 
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“the Constitution has played almost no role in substantively limiting [solitary 
confinement’s] use.”18  
Still, the momentum may be shifting.  District courts, especially as of late, 
have shown significant concern with the practice of solitary confinement—
issuing preliminary injunctions to ban certain types of solitary (especially 
confinement of juveniles and individuals with serious mental illness), allowing 
solitary cases to proceed such that significantly restrictive settlement 
agreements are signed by local and state governments, and at times even 
ultimately holding that the practice is unconstitutional in certain forms.  This 
Part will discuss four especially harsh types of segregation—long-term 
segregation, segregation of those with serious mental illness, segregation of 
youth, and segregation of individuals on death row—and how courts have 
treated their permissibility under the Eighth Amendment.  These are four 
types of solitary confinement that might be considered as possessing “plus 
factors” that elevate the harshness even beyond the baseline.  As will be 
noted, there has been some movement by courts in each area, and—
although these practices are especially prone to inflict serious and inhumane 
harm to inmates—the underlying rationales driving the movements against 
these practices apply to the core practice of solitary confinement itself, in any 
duration and with regard to any class of prisoners. 
A.  Constitutional Status of Long-Term Confinement  
Long-term isolation of the general inmate population has faced some 
constitutional scrutiny over the years, most famously in concurrences and 
dissents by Supreme Court Justices.19  The American Bar Association (the 
“ABA”) Standards for Criminal Justice regarding the Treatment of Prisoners 
defines “long-term” segregation as confinement exceeding or expected to 
exceed thirty days.20  The length of time is constitutionally meaningful 
according to the Supreme Court, as it has stated that, in determining whether 
an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, length “cannot be ignored.”21  
Two cases in the 1960s held that long-term solitary confinement can be 
an Eighth Amendment violation, but stopped short of a per se holding as it 
relates to long-term confinement.  These cases, which took place before the 
“deliberate indifference” doctrine’s development and emphasized concepts 
related to the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine, focused on the 
 
nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 
1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 18 Reinert, supra note 15, at 957. 
 19 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Davis v. Ayala, 135 
S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 20 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 23-1.0(o) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2011). 
 21 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978). 
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combination of long-term confinement and other degrading elements, 
seeming to limit their language to the particular circumstances at hand.  In 
Wright v. McMann,22 the Second Circuit held that solitary confinement “for a 
substantial period of time” is unconstitutional when it involves nudity and a 
lack of hygiene items like soap and toilet paper because the practice violates 
“civilized standards of humane decency.”23  And in Knuckles v. Prasse,24 the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a five-month 
span of solitary confinement, because it included two-and-a-half days of 
nudity, was unconstitutional.25  Ultimately, no court has found long-term 
solitary confinement to be facially unconstitutional.  
Still, cases of long-term confinement have increasingly been settled by 
state and local governments, with commitments to reform.26  Another recent 
positive development is that members of the Supreme Court, especially 
Justice Breyer and recently retired Justice Kennedy, have indicated serious 
concern with long-term confinement because of its significant psychological 
harms.  In 2015, Justice Kennedy detailed the evidence of the harms of long-
term solitary confinement.  He noted that “[y]ears on end of near-total 
isolation exact a terrible price” and lamented the lack of awareness about the 
plight of inmates in solitary confinement because “so stark an outcome [as 
the mental harm inflicted by solitary confinement] ought not to be the result 
of society’s simple unawareness or indifference.”27  Moreover, he seemed to 
show a direct interest in hearing a case related to long-term confinement:  
“[i]n a case that presented the issue, the judiciary may be required, within its 
proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether workable alternative 
systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional 
system should be required to adopt them.”28  Most recently, in a 2017 dissent, 
Justice Breyer noted “long-standing ‘serious objections’ to extended solitary 
confinement” and stated that “extended solitary confinement alone raises 
serious constitutional questions.”29  Despite this momentum at the Court, as 
will be discussed in Article III of this series, the likelihood of the Roberts 
Court changing the constitutional status of solitary confinement after Justice 
Kennedy’s retirement is slim, creating an urgent call for lower courts to take 
the lead. 
As is the case for each of the four subsets of solitary confinement discussed 
in this Part, these concerns with long-term solitary confinement, though 
 
 22 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 23 Id. at 526. 
 24 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
 25 Id. at 1061–62. 
 26 See, e.g., Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-5796, 2018 WL 1536739 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 27 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 28 Id. at 2210. 
 29 Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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more exaggerated than when it comes to solitary confinement in shorter 
periods, apply to the practice of solitary confinement as a general matter.  
Even short stints in solitary have been demonstrated to cause serious 
psychological harm—with every recorded study of the practice lasting longer 
than 10 days resulting in “negative psychological effects.”30  And the Court 
recognized in 1890 that “after even a short confinement,” prisoners were 
severely harmed.31  
B.  Constitutional Status of Confinement of Mentally Ill Individuals 
Courts have also increasingly noted the particular harm placed on 
mentally ill individuals in solitary confinement.  As one federal district court 
recognized in 2014, “[a]vailable evidence suggests that contemporary values 
are moving away from placement of seriously mentally ill prisoners in 
segregated housing.”32  In the most notable case on the subject—Madrid v. 
Gomez,33 which followed prisoner hunger strikes at Pelican Bay State Prison—
the Northern District of California went into detail about the harms of 
segregating individuals with serious mental illness:  
[S]ubjecting individuals to conditions that are ‘very likely’ to . . . seriously 
exacerbate an existing mental illness [cannot] be squared with evolving 
standards of humanity or decency . . . .  Indeed, it is inconceivable that any 
representative portion of our society would put its imprimatur on a plan to 
subject the mentally ill . . . to [the prison’s solitary confinement units], 
knowing that severe psychological consequences will most probably befall 
those inmates. . . . 
[D]ry words on paper [cannot] adequately capture the senseless suffering 
and sometimes wretched misery that defendants’ unconstitutional practices 
leave in their wake.  The anguish of descending into serious mental illness, 
the pain of physical abuse, or the torment of having serious medical needs 
that simply go unmet is profoundly difficult, if not impossible, to fully 
fathom, no matter how long or detailed the trial record may be. 34 
Similarly, courts have recognized the harms and dignity concerns with 
placing people in solitary confinement because of their mental illness.  The 
District Court of Puerto Rico put it straightforwardly: “The punishment of 
persons because they are mentally disturbed is unconscionable and 
barbaric.”35 
This increasing judicial awareness of the harms of solitary on individuals 
with mental illness has led to at least three cases holding that segregating 
those with serious mental illness violates the Eighth Amendment, in addition 
 
 30 Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 566–67 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 31 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).  
 32 Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1105–06, n.50 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
 33 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 34 Id. at 1266, 1280. 
 35 Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 35 (D.P.R. 1979). 
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to several preliminary injunctions36 and other preliminary decisions in favor 
of plaintiffs leading to settlement agreements.37  In Madrid, the district court 
stated that segregating people with serious mental illness is “the mental 
equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe,” and 
held that it violated the Eighth Amendment in all cases.38 
In Ruiz v. Johnson,39 a second per se holding case related to mental illness, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas did the same, finding it 
to be “deplorable and outrageous that [Texas’] prisons appear to have 
become a repository for a great number of its mentally ill citizens.”40  Like 
the Madrid court, the Ruiz court found the practice of segregating individuals 
with mental illness to flout the evolving standards of decency doctrine: 
The United States Constitution cannot abide such a perverse and 
unconscionable system of punishment.  As to mentally ill inmates . . . the 
severe and psychologically harmful deprivations of its administrative 
segregation units are, by our evolving and maturing society’s standards of 
humanity and decency, found to be cruel and unusual punishment.41  
While the court decried the impact of solitary confinement on all individuals, 
as did the court in Madrid, it cabined its holding only to those with serious 
mental illness, purportedly out of deference to prisons’ need to segregate 
some prisoners in some cases.42 
In addition to the traditional Eighth Amendment claim regarding 
 
 36 See, e.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1201, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (finding that the 
Alabama Department of Corrections operated a constitutionally inadequate mental healthcare 
system, one component of which was inadequate screening and intake); Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. 
Supp. 2d 1096, 1125–26 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (ordering a prison to remove inmates with serious mental 
illness from its “supermax” facility and to monitor the mental health status of inmates in 
“supermax”); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (adopting the 
magistrate judge’s conclusion that “inmates are denied access to necessary mental health care while 
they are housed in [solitary confinement]”). 
 37 See, e.g., Summary of Settlement Agreement, Cmty. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc. v. Coup, No. 15-688 (D. 
Del. 2016), http://www.declasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-06-CLASI-v-Coupe-
Summary-Sheet.pdf; Settlement Agreement, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-
10463 (D. Mass. 2007), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0004.pdf; 
see also Justice Department Closes Investigation After Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Takes Significant 
Steps to Reform Its Use of Solitary Confinement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-closes-investigation-after-pennsylvania-
department-corrections-takes (describing the DOJ’s decision to close its investigation into the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PDOC) “following significant improvements made by 
PDOC to its policies and practices that are intended to protect prisoners with serious mental illness 
and intellectual disabilities from the harmful effects of solitary confinement”). 
 38 Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1265. 
 39 Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Ruiz 
v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 40 Id. at 915. 
 41 Id. (“Persons who, with psychiatric care, could fit well into society, are instead locked away, to 
become wards of the state’s penal system.  Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they may be confined 
in conditions that nurture, rather than abate, their psychoses.”). 
 42 Id. 
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inhumane conditions of confinement, plaintiffs with serious mental illness 
have another Eighth Amendment claim that could lead to a per se holding:  
the inadequate mental health care claim.  The argument under this claim is 
that there is inherently inadequate mental health care of people with serious 
mental illness when they are placed in solitary confinement, regardless of the 
specific context at play.  A recent Third Circuit opinion surrounding 
Brandon Palakovic’s case, Palakovic v. Wetzel,43 helped to develop the theory 
behind per se satisfaction of the deliberate indifference doctrine for this type 
of Eighth Amendment claim.44  
C.  Constitutional Status of Confinement of Youth 
There have been recent chippings away at the constitutionality of placing 
youth in solitary as well.45  In 2017 alone, a district court case in New York 
held that the plaintiffs stated a claim that punitive solitary confinement of 
juveniles is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment,46 and two 
preliminary injunctions in Tennessee and Wisconsin banned the practice in 
state prisons.47  This is in addition to settlements with states before opinions 
are issued.48  In the New York case, V.W. v. Conway,49 the court reiterated 
what the Supreme Court has recognized time and time again—that youth, 
due to their continued development in adolescence, are particularly 
“susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”50  It analogized 
juveniles being placed in solitary to mentally ill individuals in the same 
position, stating they “suffer from similar, pre-existing mental conditions.”51   
The placement of juveniles in solitary confinement has made perhaps the 
biggest splash in the media, particularly due to the story of Kalief Browder.  
As detailed in The New Yorker in 2014, Kalief was a young man held in the 
notoriously brutal conditions of the Riker’s Island juvenile facility in New 
 
 43 854 F.3d 209 at 226, 228–229 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 44 For an explanation of how this opinion may help advance this argument, see generally Civil Rights 
— Eighth Amendment, supra note 16.  The court did so by highlighting that solitary confinement was 
the “key component” that brought the care to the recklessness standard.  Id. at 1485; see Palakovic, 
854 F.3d at 229.  And, as noted, “[A] defendant’s only safe harbor — arguing lack of knowledge 
of a person’s serious mental illness — is increasingly impeded by the growing judicial view that 
adequate mental health care requires adequate screening for mental illness.”  Civil Rights — Eighth 
Amendment, supra note 16, at 1487 (citing Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 45 See e.g., V.W. ex rel. Williams v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 583–85 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Doe v. Hommrich, No. 3-16-0799, 2017 WL 1091864 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2017); J.J. v. Litscher, 
No. 17-cv-47 (W.D. Wis. July 11, 2017); see also A.T. v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391 (N.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
 48 See, e.g., G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 13-cv-03667, 2015 WL 7571789 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015). 
 49 236 F. Supp. 3d 554 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 50 Id. at 583 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012)). 
 51 Id. at 584. 
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York.52  His crime: maybe stealing a backpack.53  Kalief was held in solitary 
confinement for multiple years before he was even tried for the alleged crime, 
and he eventually committed suicide.54  President Barack Obama cited 
Kalief’s story in an op-ed in The Washington Post announcing that his 
Administration would end the practice of placing youths in solitary 
confinement.55  It was a symbolic decision that built on the growing national 
consciousness about the harms of solitary confinement, especially of youth, 
but the change in policy affected only a few juveniles segregated in federal 
prisons.  
D.  Constitutional Status of Confinement of Individuals on Death Row 
Finally, another group of prisoners subjected to solitary confinement that 
has attracted attention by courts, especially the Supreme Court, is prisoners 
on death row awaiting their execution.  Among the most formidable critics 
of the practice was Justice Stevens.  In the 1995 case of Lackey v. Texas,56 he 
argued against solitary confinement for those awaiting the death penalty, 
agreeing with English jurists that “‘execution after inordinate delay would 
have infringed the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to be 
found in section 10 of the Bill of Rights 1689.’”57 
As with long-term confinement, Justices Kennedy and Breyer have 
notably amplified concerns with the issue of prolonged confinement before 
execution.  Though their aforementioned statements condemning solitary 
confinement were broad in scope, they came specifically in the context of 
individuals awaiting execution.  Justice Kennedy’s famous 2015 concurrence 
in Davis was written in relation to a federal habeas case in which the convicted 
murderer had been held in solitary confinement for “the great majority of 
his more than 25 years in custody” awaiting execution penalty.58  And Justice 
Breyer’s criticisms of long-term solitary confinement two years later came in 
a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in a case regarding an 
 
 52 Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 Years Without Trial, 
Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-
years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html. 
 55 Juliet Eilperin, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prisons, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confinement-for-
juveniles-in-federal-prisons/2016/01/25/056e14b2-c3a2-11e5-9693-
933a4d31bcc8_story.html?utm_term=.7c08c76c6550. 
 56 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.). 
 57 Id. at 1046–47. 
 58 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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individual placed in solitary confinement on death row.59  Having written 
nearly 20 years prior that “[i]t is difficult to deny the suffering inherent in a 
prolonged wait for execution,”60 he stated that the “‘human toll’ that 
accompanies extended solitary confinement is exacerbated by the fact that 
execution is in the offing.”61  He asked openly:  “[w]hat legitimate purpose 
does it serve to hold any human being in solitary confinement for 40 years 
awaiting execution?”62  And he twice reiterated the need for the Supreme 
Court to hear the constitutional question of whether solitary confinement, at 
least in the case of death row inmates, is allowable.63  Despite the recent 
concerns expressed at the highest Court, however, there has been relatively 
little in the way of progress on this particular use of solitary confinement in 
the federal courts as a general matter. 
III.  NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO WIN WITHOUT A PER SE HOLDING, AND 
ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 
A.  Long Odds of Victory 
Because there is no per se holding against solitary confinement in almost 
any form in almost every jurisdiction across the nation, prisoners and/or 
their families are left with nearly impossible odds in court.  Without a broader 
holding that the practice violates the “evolving standards of decency” 
doctrine, plaintiffs are left to argue the case-by-case application of the two-
pronged deliberate indifference doctrine.  This creates a state of affairs in 
which it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs who suffer or suffered from solitary 
confinement to win.  They are “virtually pre-ordained to fail.”64  
In analyzing the deliberate indifference doctrine, Justice White noted this 
lack of opportunity for solitary confinement litigants back in 1991 in Wilson 
v. Seiter.65  In that case, Justice White predicted that the subjective intent 
prong “likely will prove impossible to apply in many cases” because prison 
conditions are the result of “cumulative actions and inactions.”66  In other 
words, the imposition of inhumane prison conditions on inmates is not 
something that can generally be traced back to individual prison officials.  
 
 59 Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1246 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 61 Ruiz, 137 S. Ct. at 1247. 
 62 Smith v. Ryan, 137 S. Ct 1283, 1283 (2017) (Breyer, J., statement respecting the denial of 
certiorari). 
 63 Id. at 1283–84. 
 64 See John Fitzpatrick, Dir., Harvard Prison Legal Assistance Project, Remarks at Harvard Law 
School (Mar. 2, 2018) (arguing that “[p]risoners are hated across the political spectrum,” which 
diminishes prisoners’ likelihood of success). 
 65 501 U.S. 294, 306 (1991) (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
 66 Id. at 310. 
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Rather, the punishment practices are the result of multiple decisions across 
the institution such that one person alone may not be found to have the 
requisite knowledge (recklessness) to meet the deliberate indifference test’s 
second prong, but the institution itself (or the collective prison officials) could.  
So, not only does the test make it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in litigation 
about inhumane conditions of confinement, it is also not an appropriate test 
in and of itself.  As Justice White put it:  
Not only is the majority’s intent requirement a departure from precedent, it 
likely will prove impossible to apply in many cases.  Inhumane prison 
conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and inactions by 
numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period 
of time.  In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent should be 
examined, and the majority offers no real guidance on this issue.  In truth, 
intent simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an 
institution, such as a prison system. . . . 
The ultimate result of today’s decision, I fear, is that “serious deprivations 
of basic human needs” will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and 
meaningless search for “deliberate indifference.”67 
Justice Stevens agreed.  In his dissent in Estelle v. Gamble,68 the 
foundational case on mental health treatment and the Eight Amendment in 
prisons, he argued that the focus of the constitutional inquiry should be on 
“the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual 
who inflicted it.”69  “Both Justices Stevens and White recognized that one of 
the inherent problems with applying the subjective prong to solitary 
confinement conditions cases is that the nature of the evil is in the design, 
rather than the actions of the immediate prison officials.”70  And 
commentators have agreed that, as Holly Boyer puts it, it can be “next to 
impossible” to satisfy the subjective prong.71 
A helpful illustration of just how difficult it is for prisoners held in solitary 
confinement and their families to succeed in court is the Seventh Circuit case 
of Scarver v. Litscher.72  In this case over a decade ago, the court knew from 
evidence provided in previous litigation that the defendant prison officials 
actually possessed a well-known article about the harms of segregating those 
with serious mental illness.73  Even though it recognized this fact and the fact 
that there is “extensive literature” on the practice’s harms, the court held that 
knowledge of the risk of harm was not sufficient to rise to the recklessness 
 
 67 Id. at 310–11 (internal citation omitted). 
 68 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 69 Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70 Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment’ Clause 
as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317, 333 (2003). 
 71 Id. 
 72 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 73 Id. at 976. 
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standard of the deliberate indifference doctrine’s second prong.74  
B.  Enforcement Challenges Even When Successful 
Even in the rare cases of success in attaining a per se holding for at least 
a type of solitary confinement, enforcement becomes a major issue.  The 
story of Pelican Bay State Prison, the subject of Madrid’s per se holding that 
placing individuals with serious mental illness is an Eighth Amendment 
violation, is illuminating.  There, the court determined that segregating 
individuals with serious mental illness rose to a facial violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, but that segregating individuals without a serious mental illness 
did not.75  Despite recognizing the harms of segregation to all individuals, it 
drew a line between those with serious mental illness and those without it, 
leaving intact the core practice of solitary confinement: “Conditions in the 
[solitary confinement units] may well hover on the edge of what is humanly 
tolerable for those with normal resilience, particularly when endured for 
extended periods of time.  They do not, however, violate exacting Eighth 
Amendment standards, except for the specific population subgroups 
identified in this opinion.”76  Partly because of this line leaving the practice’s 
foundation intact, accountability issues have plagued the enforcement of the 
court opinion;77 traditional solitary practices still exist, so a lack of an accurate 
diagnosis might allow individuals with serious mental illness to fall through 
the cracks.  Individuals on the borders of a diagnosis can continue to be 
placed in solitary, and those who develop serious mental illnesses while in 
segregation may not be moved.  
One of many other illustrative examples of this point about challenging 
enforcement is the settlement between a disability rights organization and 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.78  In 2012, in response to litigation 
regarding the use of solitary confinement in its prisons, Massachusetts 
reached a settlement agreeing to all-but end the practice of placing 
individuals with serious mental illness in solitary confinement.79  The 
settlement agreement’s most severe restrictions were limited to individuals 
with serious mental illness and, even then, the agreement did allow for short-
term stints in solitary confinement in emergency situations.80  Enforcement 
faltered:  in 2016, Prisoners’ Legal Services, a non-profit advocacy group, 
 
 74 Id. at 975–77. 
 75 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Jules Lobel, Prof., University of Pittsburgh Law School, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Mar. 
2, 2018). 
 78 Settlement Agreement, Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-10463 (D. Mass. 2007), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MA-0026-0004.pdf. 
 79 Id. at 6. 
 80 Id. 
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sent a report to Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker showing that the state 
was unlawfully placing men with serious mental illness in solitary 
confinement.81  Even with a strong settlement agreement, the fact that the 
practice of solitary confinement was still permitted for many prisoners, and 
for seriously mentally ill prisoners for short durations in certain cases, kept 
the practice intact generally and likely made it easier for serious enforcement 
to falter.   
The story of Pelican Bay and the Massachusetts settlement teach us 
something quite clear:  as long as solitary confinement still exists at all, and 
as long as there is no bright-line per se holding that the practice is 
unconstitutional, it will likely continue in some form.  The system itself would 
need to be dismantled, either by the judiciary or legislature, for there to be 
confidence in the enforceability of a rule banning solitary for any length of 
time or for any sub-group. 
 
 
 81 Maria Cramer & Jenna Russell, Advocates: Mass. Unlawfully Isolates Mentally Ill Inmates, BOS. GLOBE 
(Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/31/massachusetts-unlawfully-
sending-mentally-ill-inmates-solitary-confinement-prisoner-advocates-
charge/cYiQVaNab70z1llVCnC4EP/story.html. 
